

## Nehru's legacy in Kashmir: Why a plebiscite never happened

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### ABSTRACT

As the dispute over Kashmir broke out in 1947, a plebiscite of the people of the state offered a mutually acceptable and ostensibly fair path out of the imbroglio. Critics have often laid the blame on Nehru, and the territory's salience to India, for why a plebiscite was never held. Based on primary documentation, this article makes the case that it was not a lack of commitment to the formula, but rather Nehru's deeply held strategic and reputational fears that motivated, first, the setting of what Delhi saw as firm but fair pre-conditions, and after the conclusion of the US-Pakistan military pact in 1954, the complete rejection of the plebiscite option.

### Introduction

May 27, 2014 marked the 50th anniversary of the death of India's first prime minister, and global statesman, Jawaharlal Nehru. Along with the celebration of his exemplary legacy for independent India's domestic and international profile, however, the event also served as a barely needed reminder of what critics and proponents alike—and, indeed, Nehru himself—viewed as the most painful blemish on his record as prime minister: the failure to find a fair and satisfactory resolution to India's major territorial disputes, with Pakistan and China.

In Kashmir,<sup>1</sup> this failure happened despite the existence of a formula that at least on the surface offered a fair path out of the imbroglio—a plebiscite through which the people of state would decide whether to be part of India or Pakistan. The Indian leadership had ostensibly committed itself to the idea soon after the accession of Kashmir to India in October 1947, and both sides had officially provided their mutual acquiescence, in principle, to such a mechanism of resolving the dispute at the United Nations (UN) in the early years of the conflict. A plebiscite, however, never materialized and was declared as out of the question by Nehru after 1954, a policy stance that Delhi has persisted with ever since, all the while unilaterally integrating Kashmir into the Indian union. Today, both sides—begrudgingly, and rarely officially in the case of Pakistan—recognize that the plebiscite option for resolving the status of Kashmir is all but dead.

Based on primary documentation, this article explores Nehru's role in why a plebiscite was never held, and was eventually abandoned by the Indian government. It particularly addresses critics' claims—in Pakistan and in the scholarly community—that the failure of the plebiscite option owed itself solely to Nehru's intransigence. By this account, India's first prime minister was never completely sincere in his commitment to a plebiscite, and had very early on determined that such a vote would not be held, a conviction that ostensibly strengthened as it became clear that India was losing the hearts and minds of a critical mass of the Kashmiri people and leadership, especially in the Kashmir valley.<sup>2</sup>

This narrative—of Nehru's intransigence—can moreover be intuitively appealing given the high salience that scholars have attributed to the territory in dispute. As a Muslim majority state up for grabs in the immediate post-independence period, Kashmir has been said to symbolize a post-partition struggle over the very validity of the contested national identities of India and Pakistan—the former having adopted a secular nationalism that stands as a complete anti-thesis to the conception of Pakistan as the home of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.<sup>3</sup> For India, and Nehru specifically, Kashmir gave “an example of communal unity and cooperation,” and the successful and peaceful integration of the state into the Indian union would have been a clear vindication of its secular national identity, invalidating thereby what was viewed as an archaic and regressive religious nationalism underpinning the idea of Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> While the nationalist value of the territory was no doubt paramount, there was also of course great strategic importance attached to Kashmir, located as it was at the apex of the subcontinent, historically buffering India from threats emanating from Russia, China, and Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> Possession of the state by a hostile Pakistan, or by another state—were Pakistan to become “a kind of colony of foreign interests”<sup>6</sup>—had the potential of posing a threat to north India.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, although there is little doubt that Kashmir was immensely important to Nehru and India, and salience does tell us a lot about the dispute itself, it proves inadequate as an explanation for Nehru's attitude towards a plebiscite. Theoretically, a territory of such high salience as Kashmir should have been viewed as indivisible by the Indian leadership, with little or no variation in India's posture over time and changing circumstance—as critics of Nehru contend was the case. Yet, as demonstrated later, despite the frustrating intractability of the dispute as a whole, the Nehru government's policies with regard to Kashmir and a plebiscite were never so zero-sum.

This article will make the case that, following the tribal invasion and Kashmir's accession to India—and Delhi voluntarily making the accession conditional on its confirmation through a reference to the people of the state—Nehru's government was indeed committed to a plebiscite, despite apprehensions about the practicability of it. Crucially, this was so not only during periods when Delhi was confident of a favorable verdict, but also at a time when there was a precipitous drop in Kashmiri support for union with India, and Nehru was

convinced that the state was destined to go to Pakistan. Indian preconditions for a plebiscite that proved unacceptable to Karachi were motivated not by some fundamental insincerity—as part of an elaborate delaying mechanism—on the part of the Indian leadership. Rather, they were influenced by Nehru’s deeply held fears that conceding on what Delhi saw as perfectly legitimate preconditions—enshrined no less in UN resolutions—to a Pakistani leadership with doubtful bona fides would carry unacceptable strategic (in the Kashmir theater) and reputational costs for India.

Only after 1954 did Nehru adopt a clearly intransigent position on Kashmir, backing out of the plebiscite option, asserting instead that the dispute could only be resolved in keeping with the existing status quo that left around two thirds of the disputed state with India. This was a result of the conclusion of the US-Pakistan military pact in 1954, a development that for Nehru only magnified further the potential reputational and strategic costs of making any significant concessions to Pakistan, let alone giving up Kashmir. The dramatic change in context required, for Delhi, a further hardening of India’s stance in order to disabuse Pakistan of the impression that the former would succumb to military pressure, resulting in the earlier promised retraction of the plebiscite offer. From that point on, accession was treated as complete and incontestable.

### **Independence, accession of Kashmir, and the plebiscite option**

In the lead up to partition and the eventual accession of Kashmir to India, it was clear that the Indian leadership was open to the idea of the state becoming part of Pakistan, particularly if the people of the state wished it. This was in part a practical reaction to the recognition that Kashmir was as, if not more, salient to a “tottering” Pakistan<sup>8</sup> and that conflict over the territory, while it would undoubtedly lead to defeat and destruction for Pakistan, would “at the same time...mean ruin of India also for a considerable time.”<sup>9</sup> What was more, although the costs of conflict were seen a prohibitively high, a conciliatory stance was facilitated by Nehru’s skepticism that for all the hostility of the Muslim League, it was unlikely that a fledgling Pakistan with or without Kashmir would—as Nehru put it to Sheikh Abdullah—“survive at all,” let alone be able to significantly threaten India, an evaluation shared by leaders of the new Pakistani state.<sup>10</sup>

As the lapse of British paramountcy approached, the Indian National Congress accepted the right of the states to join one or the other dominion as undisputed, only raising objection to the possibility of independence for the princely dominions.<sup>11</sup> The prospect of several of these states remaining independent after all created the very real possibility of the “balkanization” of India, a concern shared by the British as well.<sup>12</sup> With regard to Kashmir, in particular, Nehru’s advice to the Maharaja would only be that independence for the state was unwise because “in the world today such small independent entities have no place...”<sup>13</sup> Barring that, Mountbatten, Nehru, and Sardar Patel all seemed to

agree that an outcome where Kashmir acceded to Pakistan was preferable to the Maharaja allowing paramountcy to lapse, and pushing the fate of the state into a dangerous limbo.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, given the Maharaja's apparent inclination toward independence, Mountbatten attempted to convince him otherwise, while conveying an assurance from Patel that "if Kashmir decided to accede to Pakistan, we will be perfectly friendly about it."<sup>15</sup>

The prospect of Kashmir acceding to Pakistan was especially palatable to the Indian leadership were it to reflect the wishes of the Kashmiri population. "Ascertain the wishes of your people by any means and join whichever Dominion your people wish to join by August 14 this year," was therefore Mountbatten's urging to the Maharaja on behalf of the Indian government in July 1947.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, even as the Maharaja gradually began gravitating towards joining India, a desire that turned to desperation as the tribal invasion from Pakistan commenced on October 22, 1947, Nehru was firm—at the risk of infuriating the ruler and facilitating a Pakistani military *fait accompli*—that accession had to be seen to emanate from the people of the Kashmir, and therefore required substantial political reforms and concessions to the popular leader Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference party.<sup>17</sup> Only once this was done, did the Nehru government accept Kashmir's instrument of accession, and send Indian troops to the state on the request of both the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah.<sup>18</sup> According to Jha, "Nehru was prepared to lose the Valley and Srinagar to the raiders and take it back later, if this was necessary to force the Maharaja to take Abdullah into the government."<sup>19</sup>

Having accepted the instrument of accession, moreover, Mountbatten immediately informed the Maharaja that "in consistence with their policy that in the case of any state where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."<sup>20</sup> The day after, and several times thereafter, Nehru confirmed the same to the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.<sup>21</sup> The Indian representative to the UN did the same on the day (January 1, 1948) that India formally referred the dispute to the Security Council, seeking support against aggression from Pakistan.<sup>22</sup>

Once the dispute was taken cognizance of by the UN, the plebiscite option quickly acquired centrality, as the details of the paths to a plebiscite began to be vociferously debated, and given more concretized form. Three resolutions are of particular importance in this context. Resolution 47 of the Security Council—adopted on April 21, 1948—made the initial call for such a solution, noting the desire of both sides for the issue of accession to be "decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite."<sup>23</sup> In order to bring this plan to fruition, the resolution recommended as precursor, the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir, and the

almost simultaneous reduction of Indian forces in the state to the minimum required for law and order. Resolution 47 further provided for the establishment of a plebiscite administration and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator by the UN Secretary General. Finally, in order to facilitate and expedite the entire process, the earlier established UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was expanded from three to five members, and asked to immediately proceed to the subcontinent.

Two further resolutions followed, these issued by the newly expanded UNCIP, following their visit to India and Pakistan. The first UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948 stipulated that Pakistan—having recently been discovered to have introduced regular military troops into Kashmir—first withdraw all nationals from the state before India progressively removed the bulk of its forces.<sup>24</sup> Once these truce arrangements were agreed and adhered to, consultations over plebiscite arrangements could begin. The second UNCIP resolution of January 5, 1949 reiterated the acceptance by both sides of the principle of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, and in accordance with the first resolution confirmed that such a vote would only be held once the demilitarization plan had been executed, and plebiscite arrangements completed, with an administrator to oversee the plebiscite to be nominated by the UN Secretary General.<sup>25</sup> While it rejected the first resolution, the Indian government, after seeking some clarifications from the commission, acquiesced to the two UNCIP resolutions.

It is clear then from the aforementioned discussion that despite the high salience of Kashmir, the territory was far from indivisible for the Indian leadership at this early stage. A plebiscite, in particular, seemingly offered itself to the Indian leadership as an obvious and eminently suitable method for settling the Kashmir dispute, to the extent that Nehru was willing to publicly express his acceptance and commitment to the mechanism, unilaterally at first and then bilaterally, with Pakistan and multilaterally at the UN. Why then, given these facts, did Nehru's government fail to follow through on his stated commitments and implement a plebiscite? In what follows, I demonstrate that although the Indian prime minister's commitment to a plebiscite was unwavering in principle in the early years of the dispute, it was over the details of the terms and conditions under which such a plebiscite could be held—specifically the issues related to demilitarization and state administration alluded to in the UN resolutions—that the mechanism would flounder. Importantly, I suggest that India's position on these details regarding the prerequisites to the conduct of a plebiscite were a consequence of strategic and reputational considerations in Delhi, and not some insincerity on the part of the Indian leadership.

### **Nehru's commitment to the plebiscite option**

Critics have asserted that Nehru, given the importance of the territory, never really accepted the possibility of losing Kashmir, and rather used the promise

of a plebiscite as a delaying mechanism to cement India's military and political stranglehold over the state. Pakistan's prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan expressed such skepticism early on in accusing the Indian government of intending to "complete their occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and get entire control over its territory under superficial attractive slogan that ultimately the fate of Kashmir will be decided by people of Kashmir..."<sup>26</sup> Scholars have similarly pointed to Nehru's occasional expression of skepticism about the wisdom and practicality of holding a plebiscite. Noorani, for instance, points to a missive from Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah in August 1952 in which the former admitted to having "ruled out the plebiscite for all practical purposes."<sup>27</sup>

Such an argument moreover implies that to the extent that there was any sincerity to the offer, the intention was always of only holding a plebiscite under conditions that would ensure India's retention of Kashmir. Hence the early enthusiasm for a plebiscite, when Nehru believed India had both Abdullah's and the Kashmiri population's favor,<sup>28</sup> and its rejection by 1954, as support for India in the state dropped precipitously, particularly in the lead up to, and the aftermath of, Abdullah's removal from power and imprisonment in August 1953.<sup>29</sup>

Contrary to these assertions, however, historical evidence strongly points to the Indian government's commitment to the plebiscite until 1954. This was true not only in the early years when Nehru privately and publicly welcomed a plebiscite "as early as possible," in order to "put an end to this business of the doubt of others,"<sup>30</sup> and indeed convinced Abdullah against taking any actions which would confirm Kashmir's accession to India in violation of India's commitment to a plebiscite.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, Nehru "repeatedly emphasized to Sheikh Abdullah and other Ministers in Kashmir that it would be a wrong approach for the constituent assembly even to discuss such subjects as accession," a fact confirmed by one of Nehru's greatest detractors, Syama Prasad Mookerjee.<sup>32</sup>

The more striking evidence of the Indian government's commitment to a plebiscite, however, lies in Nehru's serious revival of the option in late 1953, when both Abdullah and public opinion in Kashmir had turned decidedly anti-India.<sup>33</sup> By June 1953, Nehru had conceded that were a plebiscite to be held in the state, India was sure to lose, and that Delhi could not seek to hold on to Kashmir "at the point of a bayonet."<sup>34</sup> President Rajendra Prasad shared the assessment,<sup>35</sup> and concluded that while a solution along the status quo was ideal for India, Delhi could suggest to Karachi either zonal plebiscites, or a plebiscite restricted to the valley, which would likely mean losing the Kashmir valley, but at least leave Jammu with India.<sup>36</sup>

In accordance with this advice, in late July 1953 Nehru began giving the plebiscite a new push in meetings with the Pakistani leadership. To the soon to be head of the Kashmir administration, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad,

Nehru wrote that while India's efforts in Kashmir had been in vain, "even so we have to behave decently and honorably, adhering to what we have stood for."<sup>37</sup> Even as public mood in Kashmir worsened with Abdullah's dismissal, Nehru wrote to Prasad that his government's policy with regard to the plebiscite would remain the same.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, he began to actively sell the idea to Bakshi, in full cognizance that it was "obvious that some parts of the state will plump for India; other parts for Pakistan."<sup>39</sup>

Consequently, Nehru raised the proposal officially during talks with the Pakistani leadership in August 1953. He prefaced the offer to resuscitate the plebiscite option with the assertion that the "only way left was to cast the responsibility for the settlement on the people of Kashmir themselves," even calling for a "different approach" to the disposition of Indian and Pakistani forces in the state, so as to not unnecessarily retard the holding of a vote.<sup>40</sup> The Indian government's only demand during these talks was that the plebiscite administrator not be from one of the major powers, so as to avoid embroiling the dispute again in great power politics.<sup>41</sup>

Important to note here is the fact that it was Nehru who initiated the proposal, rather than having it imposed upon him, and that the offer was made despite initial opposition from the new leadership in Kashmir.<sup>42</sup> That he was willing to do so at this point, despite anticipating defeat, makes problematic arguments that Delhi had sought to avoid a plebiscite all along, or only desired it under conditions where a positive outcome was assured. As Nehru had seemingly concluded, and wrote to the Pakistani prime minister: "we are not going to settle this problem by mere cleverness or trying to overreach each other. We are also not going to settle it by coercive processes, whether they are of the nature of war or some other. Nor can it be settled by coercion exercised on the people of Kashmir or any large section thereof."<sup>43</sup>

## India and the failure of the plebiscite option

If Nehru's intentions were sincere, what then was the Indian role in a plebiscite never taking place? From the very beginning, India adopted a firm stance on two primary issues regarding the conditions under which a vote would be held: one, the disposition of the two sides' military forces (the "quantum of forces"), and second, the nature of the political dispensation in Kashmir in the lead up to, and during the conduct of the plebiscite.<sup>44</sup> On the first question, Delhi insisted on a complete demilitarization by Pakistan (including the tribal and "Azad" Kashmir forces) of the territory under its control, which would be accompanied by the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces in Kashmir.<sup>45</sup> In essence, the Indian stance was that "all armed forces should be removed from the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line



and that Pakistan should exercise no authority over the area which it invaded.”<sup>46</sup>

Delhi’s second pre-condition required that following demilitarization a plebiscite would be conducted under the authority of the existing administration in the state, and not—as Pakistan and others demanded—under an “impartial” administration. Nehru rejected the prospect of “any other administration to be imposed on Jammu and Kashmir” as interference in the internal affairs of India and Kashmir.<sup>47</sup> To address concerns that such an arrangement would simply allow India and Abdullah to manufacture an outcome, however, Indian officials made clear that UN appointees could organize and conduct the plebiscite as long as their authority was seen to derive from the Kashmir administration.<sup>48</sup>

From 1947 through to Nehru’s offer in 1953, Delhi’s position on these two issues constituted the primary Indian obstacle to a plebiscite.<sup>49</sup> Such pre-conditions, however, were not part of an elaborate Indian effort to forestall the very possibility of a plebiscite being held in Kashmir. Rather, as I demonstrate in the following section, such Indian prerequisites were influenced to a significant degree by a concern in Delhi that the failure to stipulate these conditions—conditions that were viewed to be in accordance with both UN resolutions, and what Indian officials saw as their legal rights in the state—would carry prohibitive strategic and reputational costs that were liable to be exploited by a hostile Pakistan, the credibility of whose commitments was highly suspect.

### ***Commitment problem in the Kashmir theater***

In Indian perceptions during this period, while a weak Pakistan posed little in the nature of an overarching threat, the situation in the theater of conflict itself was far less sanguinary. In Kashmir, Pakistan—despite lacking physical control of much of the territory, or the overall military capability to match India—enjoyed the benefit of being able to project itself militarily with greater ease. The two major land routes that had connected Kashmir to British India passed through Pakistan, and significantly the only all-weather road linking Kashmir to the outside world connected Srinagar to Rawalpindi.<sup>50</sup> Even before the tribal invasion, Nehru had noted with fear the ease with which Pakistani troops could enter the state “when the winter isolates Kashmir” from India.<sup>51</sup> Following the invasion, of course, Pakistan’s logistical advantages naturally meant that—as Mountbatten would articulate—“for every crore that it [military conflict in Kashmir] cost India, undoubtedly Pakistan would hardly have to spend a lakh.”<sup>52</sup>

Although these strategic advantages Pakistan enjoyed in Kashmir made its leadership’s protestations of benign intentions suspect to Delhi, Pakistani commitments were only made less credible by perceptions in India of



Karachi's inveterate hostility. Soon after partition, fear that Pakistan was intent on "balkanizing" India had led Nehru to comment on the Muslim League's "utter lack of bona fides and its venom and enmity against India."<sup>53</sup> At a more immediate level, such suspicions were confirmed in what Nehru firmly believed to be the Pakistan government's active role in the planning and execution of the tribal assault on Kashmir.<sup>54</sup> These perceptions naturally made for a severe dearth of confidence in Delhi that Pakistan would adhere to any of its stated commitments. As G. S. Bajpai, the then Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) put it, extreme hate for India in Pakistan meant that any settlement (on Kashmir or any other issue) was unlikely to be "sincere or enduring."<sup>55</sup>

It was this intense commitment problem that the Indian leadership faced in the Kashmir theater that engendered strategic and reputational concerns in Delhi, which in turn manifested themselves in Indian firmness with regard to the conditions under which a plebiscite could be held in the state.

### ***The strategic calculus***

Strategic concerns were most pertinent to Indian demands on the quantum of forces issue. For Nehru, even with an end to the fighting in Kashmir, there was "no surety of good behavior on the Pakistan side and even less on the part of the tribes."<sup>56</sup> With such little faith in Pakistani bona fides, a complete withdrawal of Indian troops (as demanded by Pakistan) was out of the question.<sup>57</sup> Given Pakistan's logistical advantages, and its "neurotic mood and hostile actions," an "insurance against such recurrence of aggression" was viewed as imperative.<sup>58</sup> The prospect of Pakistani military presence in the plebiscite area was therefore even less acceptable,<sup>59</sup> given—as Dixon concluded—"the experience that India had of what occurred in the autumn of 1947."<sup>60</sup>

Such concerns mounted over the years with the perception of increasing bellicosity in Pakistan, as well as the strengthening of (pro) Pakistani military presence and capabilities in Kashmir. By 1951, tensions over the formation of the Kashmir constituent assembly as well as communal tensions in Bengal were perceived in Delhi to have generated a strong mood of *jehad* within even the highest echelons in Pakistan.<sup>61</sup> In view of the Rawalpindi conspiracy—a failed coup by Pakistan Army officers seeking more assertive policies in Kashmir—and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in October 1951, the Indian leadership became increasingly fearful that control of Pakistan might either pass to "wild men,"<sup>62</sup> or result in Pakistani adventurism in Kashmir to divert attention from the domestic ferment.<sup>63</sup> As Nehru colorfully observed, the government in Pakistan was "like someone riding a bicycle. They feel the moment they return to normalcy the bicycle stops and they fall down."<sup>64</sup> In this context, the formation of the constituent assembly was likely to be "the

final nail in the coffin as far as Kashmir was concerned,” possibly prompting Karachi to resort to force.<sup>65</sup>

Such risks were further compounded by the progressive strengthening of the Pakistan backed “Azad Kashmir” forces, a development that even the UNCIP noted “makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange...”<sup>66</sup> By early 1953, the “Azad” forces had become stronger, better trained, and well equipped, and for Nehru the fact that these troops were backed up by regular Pakistani concentrations at a distance of around 20–25 miles from the ceasefire line only magnified the threat they posed. Significant Indian military presence in Kashmir was viewed therefore as an absolute necessity so as to secure the state prior to and during a plebiscite, with any reduction possible only “if all Pakistan troops were withdrawn from ‘Azad’ area and ‘Azad’ forces disarmed and disbanded.”<sup>67</sup>

Substantive concessions on the quantum of forces issue were consequently made unfeasible under conditions where Delhi feared that to do so would present Pakistan with exploitable military-strategic advantages. Moreover, given the fundamental concerns about Pakistan’s sincerity, concessions with regard to the political administration of the state were regarded as similarly dangerous. By diminishing Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, and yielding to Pakistan’s claims for parity in the state, the Indian leadership feared they would provide Karachi with a legitimate political vantage point from which to further intensify their challenge. The demand for an “impartial” administration by Pakistan was viewed as a ploy, which if conceded would surely have been exploited by Pakistan. Hence, the insistence that Kashmir’s accession to India was final and valid until a plebiscite was held, and that until that point, Pakistan had no constitutional position in the state and therefore could play no role in the preparations and conduct of a plebiscite.<sup>68</sup>

What could be more advantageous to Pakistan, Nehru would consequently ask Dixon, than to be able to say that they had “kicked out the Kashmir Government and the India Government from Kashmir...[that would be] patently ninety per cent of victory for Pakistan then and there, quite apart from the plebiscite.”<sup>69</sup> India’s experience had demonstrated that vague formulas and commitments were dangerous with an “amazingly unscrupulous” Pakistan, with whom “sometimes it almost appears that unscrupulousness pays.”<sup>70</sup> Conciliatory moves, therefore, were expected to only present Karachi with a military-strategic or political position from which to make further, more extensive, demands in Kashmir.

### ***Reputational calculus***

For the Indian government, the potential reputational implications of their actions were equally of concern. That the Indian leadership was open to

Pakistan's acquisition of the state from early on, if the people of Kashmir so wished, indicated on the one hand that compromise in an off itself did not suggest itself as reputationally costly to Delhi. Indeed, for Nehru in particular, the concessions that his government was willing to make were more indicative of Indian generosity and benevolence, rather than weakness. He would therefore repeatedly emphasize to Pakistani leaders that in offering a plebiscite, despite Kashmir having legally acceded to them, the Indian government "had already gone far further than they need have done...[even though] there was no necessity for them to have done this."<sup>71</sup>

On the other hand, however, the threat Pakistan posed within the Kashmir theater itself, its better logistical position to project military power in the state, and perhaps most importantly Karachi's complicity in the tribal invasion, made the *terms and conditions* under which compromise, and particularly a plebiscite, was to be given effect to of great reputational import to the Indian leadership. Underlying Nehru's fear that whatever suggestions India made, Pakistan would take advantage of and ask for more,<sup>72</sup> was a strong reputational logic. Accordingly, not only was there a desire in Delhi to avoid concessions that altered the military-strategic or political context in Pakistan's favor, but also an insistence that no concessions be made which might signal weakness. Indian firmness that a certain basic set of conditions be met before a plebiscite could be held was, to a good degree, motivated by this imperative for reputation building.<sup>73</sup>

Soon after the tribal invasion, therefore, Nehru argued that the mere desire for peace with Pakistan, and concessions to that end, were ironically more likely to precipitate war. "Any surrender" by India to "this kind of aggression would lead to continuing aggressions elsewhere... [and] war would become inevitable between India and Pakistan."<sup>74</sup> Pakistan's failure to formally agree to a plebiscite, two months after it had been offered by India, was viewed in Delhi as a clear indication that peace was only possible if India resisted aggression firmly, since "that is the only way Pakistan seems to understand."<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, on legal and moral grounds, the Indian leadership considered their case to be strong, while Pakistan stood undisputedly condemned. To succumb to aggression on policies that were "consider[ed] on both moral and practical grounds to be perfectly justifiable," was therefore viewed as even more reputationally damaging, and therefore unacceptable.<sup>76</sup> Peace, after all, Nehru contended, could not be achieved were it to be based on "untruth, immorality and acceptance of brutal aggression."<sup>77</sup> Pakistan's whole policy, as that of the Muslim league before it, had been premised on the efficacy of "threat and bullying," where "appeasement only leads to more bullying."<sup>78</sup>

This perception necessitated, from the Indian perspective, a clear stance of not submitting to coercion. Delhi's preconditions to a plebiscite in insisting on first rectifying Pakistani aggression and denying Karachi any standing in the state, therefore, sought to serve this very end. Any other approach, and

“aggression stands justified and will be repeated as in the past.”<sup>79</sup> Criticism at the UN, therefore, also earned Indian annoyance for failing to acknowledge that the “acceptance of any aggression at any time and more especially in the present circumstances, means encouraging it for the future and has very far-reaching consequences.”<sup>80</sup> By staying firm, Delhi sought to signal not only to Pakistan that “gangster tactics” would not work, but also to the great powers at the UN that India would not succumb to their “bullying.”<sup>81</sup>

To the Indian prime minister, it was extraordinary that despite India’s generous concessions, “gradually the aggressor wants equality with us in everything, and a step further, it wants predominance in everything.”<sup>82</sup> Any further compromise by India, it was felt, would signal that Pakistan had succeeded in aggression “with all the psychological and other consequences that flow from it.”<sup>83</sup> The Indian approach to the Kashmir dispute was therefore essentially conceived in Delhi as one “in which firmness is tempered by reason and restraint.”<sup>84</sup> Being overly accommodative was seen as unwise, and the appeal by others for “greatness” on India’s part as hardly appropriate, because it was precisely such a logic that led in fact to appeasement, with all its negative implications.<sup>85</sup>

### **Taking the plebiscite option off the table**

The hopes for a concerted push toward plebiscite in Kashmir, which the late 1953 bilateral talks had evoked, were soon crushed with India’s abrupt withdrawal of the offer. The wishes of the people of Kashmir, which until recently had held priority for Nehru, were now seemingly sidelined. By late 1954, the Indian prime minister had confessed that despite the fact that Karachi now seemed “anxious to have a settlement and is prepared to go some distance for it,” he himself saw “no way out except a recognition by both parties of the status quo, subject to minor modifications.”<sup>86</sup> Indeed, by now, Nehru was asking his envoys to make no reference to the plebiscite issue in any talks with their Pakistani interlocutors.<sup>87</sup> Having reluctantly entered into talks with Pakistani leaders in May 1955, Nehru made it clear that the “only practical and safe way of dealing with it [Kashmir] was to accept present conditions as they were, that is, the status quo, and then proceed on that basis.”<sup>88</sup> He yet again ruled out a plebiscite in talks with Pakistani leaders in 1956, despite indications that Karachi was now willing even to accept his 1953 proposal of a plebiscite along regional lines.<sup>89</sup> As Nehru made clear to heads of Indian missions abroad, while he had not discounted the possibility of further talks with Pakistan, his government would “no longer talk on the old basis.”<sup>90</sup>

The crucial development to trigger this drastic reversal of policy by India was the US-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954, whereby Pakistan agreed to enter into a defense relationship with the United States, in

return for substantial military aid. Even prior to the 1953 talks, there had been concern in Delhi regarding reports in the American and Pakistani presses of the impending military pact.<sup>91</sup> Soon after those talks, as the prospect of the military agreement began to concretize, Nehru warned Karachi that they had a choice between winning Kashmir through plebiscite, and entering a military alliance with the United States.<sup>92</sup> He emphasized that prior discussions had taken place in “a particular context which existed then, and which exists, if you like even today,” but would change dramatically were the pact to be concluded, meaning that all “problems will be seen in a new light.”<sup>93</sup>

Once the US-Pakistan agreement was officially concluded, therefore, Delhi unsurprisingly reversed its position on the plebiscite, as promised. For Delhi, the pact, by fundamentally changing expectations regarding Pakistan’s military capabilities and bargaining strength in Kashmir, heightened the intensity of the potential strategic and reputational costs attendant on compromise along old lines. In response, the Indian leadership assumed a position of increasing firmness, key to which was a refusal to any longer contemplate a plebiscite in Kashmir, and insist instead on a solution along the prevailing status quo.

### ***Strategic logic***

From a strategic perspective, the US-Pakistan pact promised to so change the military balance in the subcontinent, that a plebiscite and the prospect of losing Kashmir, both of which had so far been acceptable to the Indian leadership, became immediately problematic. With regard to the plebiscite and Kashmir theater specifically, the pact was seen in Delhi to only further complicate the already contentious quantum of forces issue.<sup>94</sup> As Nehru saw it, with their progressively augmented military capabilities added to pre-existing logistical advantages, even moving Pakistani troops 20 or 30 miles behind the ceasefire line would have done very little to mitigate the strategic quandary that India faced.<sup>95</sup> It had consequently become “absurd to talk of demilitarization,”<sup>96</sup> and India needed to “retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in Kashmir” as was seen fit.<sup>97</sup> Any major withdrawal from Kashmir was inconceivable given the ease with which an aggressive Pakistan, likely to over time be equipped with more potent military forces, could resort to force in the state.<sup>98</sup> With a satisfactory demilitarization formula unlikely to be found, the pursuit of a plebiscite also lost any practical meaning for the Indian leadership.

Beyond the Kashmir theater and the plebiscite, moreover, the military pact also meant that the prospect of losing Kashmir itself became strategically unacceptable.<sup>99</sup> “It is not merely the Kashmir question that has become much more difficult,” Nehru declared, “but a serious threat has

arisen to India's security."<sup>100</sup> The military aid to Pakistan was expected to both "facilitate and encourage aggression," regardless of American assurances.<sup>101</sup> Based on such fears, by early 1954 Nehru began to raise serious concerns about military preparedness at home.<sup>102</sup> For someone who had all along emphasized the importance of economic and industrial development as a foundation for military strength in the future, Nehru now concluded that security "cannot be provided for by some long distance programme of production," and required serious consideration of rapid military acquisitions.<sup>103</sup>

Political developments in Pakistan only exacerbated fears in India that any concessions, including the loss of Kashmir itself, would be exploited toward further imperiling Indian security. As the military acquired political supremacy across the border, Nehru felt that Pakistan's government "did not have a political or economic purpose or background, but was moved by a mentality which was adventurous and military..."<sup>104</sup> A government, Nehru felt, that had used the bogey of an Indian threat to divert attention domestically from poor governance, could only be expected to become even more adventurous with the generous military aid it was receiving.<sup>105</sup> "So far as the external danger to India is concerned," Nehru concluded, "the only possible danger is from Pakistan."<sup>106</sup>

### ***Reputational considerations***

Beyond the strategic calculus, the drastically changed context in the subcontinent made reputation building even more necessary for Delhi. Given the prior experience of use of force by Pakistan, accompanied now by that country's rapidly increasing military capabilities, intransigence with regard to Kashmir—including the rejection of a plebiscite—became a means of demonstrating firmness and resolve on India's part.

For Nehru, it was apparent that in Pakistan the belief now prevailed that faced with greater strength, India would have no choice but to sooner or later relent on Kashmir. Pakistan was seemingly engulfed in talk of *jihad*, with open boasts that having built up military strength, Karachi intended to speak to India from a position of strength.<sup>107</sup> This increasing confidence in Pakistan manifested itself in extensive demands made during the 1955 talks, which to Nehru were terms reminiscent of those dictated by a victor to the surrendering enemy.<sup>108</sup> Following the failure of those talks, the Pakistani prime minister had also allegedly made clear—reflecting growing confidence that time was on his country's side—that he was no longer "going to seek interview with Nehru but if Nehru wants discussions on Kashmir" they could meet, provided the venue was Karachi.<sup>109</sup> Indeed, by 1957, the new Pakistani leader, Huseyn Suhrawardy was publicly claiming that India's stranglehold over Kashmir was breaking, and that Pakistan's involvement in

the western alliance had made “a favorable turn in the Kashmir dispute possible.”<sup>110</sup> Increasing border violations added to the concern that the Pakistani leadership sought to “settle disputes with India from what is called a position of strength.”<sup>111</sup>

India’s response, Nehru now determined, was to demonstrate even greater firmness on Kashmir so as to leave no room for doubt in Pakistan that his government would not succumb in the face of military threats, and Pakistan’s increasing bargaining strength. Hence the insistence that the status quo was the maximum Delhi was willing to concede in Kashmir, and the decision to withdraw even that offer once Karachi had rejected it.<sup>112</sup> Instead, Nehru instructed his officials that the “question of partition does not arise now and must not be raised.”<sup>113</sup> The Indian leadership were determined to not weaken in any way, or even suggest that they were willing to discuss or make alternative proposals,<sup>114</sup> which might be treated as commitments, until India’s “honor as a country is not vindicated.”<sup>115</sup> Altogether absurd, it was felt, were calls to India to make “generous gestures” in the interest of peace, gestures that would smack more of surrender than anything else.<sup>116</sup> “I am quite sure,” Nehru had by now concluded, “that if the Kashmir issue was settled even to the satisfaction of Pakistan, our troubles with Pakistan will continue. The issue is a much deeper one.”<sup>117</sup>

Indeed, Nehru now confessed that in hindsight his government had in previous years been too “reasonable” and “decent” in the interest of peace.<sup>118</sup> “In the past we made a mistake in being too accommodating to Pakistan,” Nehru wrote, and those earlier concessions were now being held against India as commitments.<sup>119</sup> “It may well be,” he acknowledged, “that if we had adopted a somewhat more rigid policy right from the beginning...we might have been in a better position to deal with this question now...As usual, those who want a settlement are always at a slight disadvantage as compared to those who do not want it except on their own basis, that is, surrender by the other party.”<sup>120</sup> With this recognition, Nehru concluded that the only viable response to Pakistan and its backers’ attempts to bully and frighten India was to adopt an even firmer stance.<sup>121</sup> The plebiscite proposal had been “picked up and misused by Pakistan,” and the Indian government was no longer willing to put itself in a similar position.<sup>122</sup>

The essence of the matter, as Nehru saw it, was that while Pakistan persisted with its hostility, India was “neither a small nor an ignoble country to submit to threats and bullying.”<sup>123</sup> Although peace with Pakistan was desirable, the Indian government could not concede on its basic demands because doing so “only encourages the other party to open its mouth wider, claim more and shout more.” “Surrender,” after all, “creates a position of future demands for surrender and so it goes on step by step.”<sup>124</sup> Peace, therefore, and a resolution of the Kashmir problem that ignored “certain basic issues and which endeavors to put us on the same level as Pakistan—that is the aggressor and the aggressed



continue on the same level” was simply unacceptable to Nehru.<sup>125</sup> To the extent that Pakistan was unresponsive to these terms, such concerns underlay the failure of the plebiscite option under Nehru.

## Conclusion

Most prominent accounts of the Kashmir dispute attribute Nehru’s role in the failure to achieve peace to the immense nationalist, strategic, and even emotional value India’s first prime minister attached to the territory. To critics of Nehru, such high stakes created a sense of indivisibility about the disputed territory that naturally engendered an intransigence, and even insincerity, in how the Indian government of the time addressed the dispute both bilaterally and in international forums. Such a posture arguably manifested itself most starkly in the failure of what at the time seemed the most reasonable and fair means of determining the future of the state: a plebiscite wherein the people of the state would decide their own fates.

This article has made the case that strong as the pull of Kashmir was for Nehru and the Indian government, it rendered neither the territory indivisible nor Delhi’s approach to it duplicitous. Indeed, and no doubt with some reluctance, Nehru remained committed to compromise and to carrying out a plebiscite in Kashmir until 1954, even during times when he and others in Delhi were convinced that the disenchanted people of the state would throw their lot in with Pakistan. Rather, the Indian obstacles to the plebiscite—pre-conditions regarding demilitarization and the political dispensation in the state—were motivated not by a desire to stall the process altogether, but by fear that making concessions on those issues would carry with them strategic and reputational costs in the Kashmir theater that would be easily exploited by a Pakistan that had already demonstrated hostile intentions.

Only in 1954 did Nehru abandon the idea of a plebiscite, insisting instead on settling the issue in keeping with the existing status quo. This the Indian government did directly in response to Pakistan signing a military pact with the United States, a development that Delhi feared only exacerbated the strategic and reputational costs of any concessions in Kashmir. For Nehru, the dramatically changed context made, on the one hand, the loss of Kashmir strategically unviable, and on the other necessitated the adoption of an increasingly intransigent stance to convey Indian resolve to a hostile and increasingly potent adversary. This change of approach of course signified the end of the plebiscite as a viable option from Delhi’s perspective. Instead, the Indian government began functioning on the basis that, as one scholar has put it, “Kashmir’s accession to India was final and irrevocable, not

subject to negotiation with Pakistan or, by implication, with the Kashmiris,<sup>126</sup> and this continues to be Delhi's stance today.

## Notes

1. In keeping with the general practice in the scholarship on the issue, this article will adopt the shorthand "Kashmir" to refer to what is technically the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, while the term "Kashmiri" correctly refers to the inhabitants of the Kashmir region of the state, I use the term to denote the population of the state as a whole.
2. A. G. Noorani, "The Kashmiri Mind," *Frontline* 21, no. 23 (November 2004); A. G. Noorani, "Kashmir: Bridge, not a Battle Ground," *Frontline* 23, no. 6 (December, 2007).
3. Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
4. Nehru to Sri Prakasa (November 25, 1947), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Second Series* (Hereafter SWJN-SS), vol. 4 (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1984), 346.
5. Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict : India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War* (New York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 10.
6. Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah (October 10, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 270.
7. "Impracticability of an Independent Kashmir" (August 25, 1952), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 19, 326.
8. Nehru to P. C. Mahajan (October 21, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 272.
9. "Solution by Referendum" (October 1, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 427.
10. Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah (October 10, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 269; Judith M. Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 266; Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 25–48.
11. V. P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* (Calcutta, India: Orient Longmans, 1956), 81.
12. Michael Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1953), 20. British PM Atlee hoped "that all States will, in due course, find their appropriate place within one or the other of the new Dominions..." Quoted in Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (Bombay, India: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1967), 77.
13. Nehru to the Maharaja, *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 3, 253.
14. See H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1985), 443.
15. Lord Mountbatten Oral Transcript, recorded by B. R. Nanda, NMML Oral History Project (July 26, 1967), 43; Menon, *The Story*, 394.
16. Quoted in Gupta, *Kashmir*, 92.
17. Nehru to Patel (September 27, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 264; Prem Shankar Jha, *Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947* (New Delhi, India/New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 45–51.
18. Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict*, 52–53.
19. Jha, *Origins of a Dispute*, 49.
20. Lord Mountbatten to the Maharaja (October 27, 1947), in M. S. Deora and R. Grover, eds. *Documents on Kashmir Problem*, vol. 1, (New Delhi, India: Discovery Publishing House, 1991), 16.

21. Nehru to Liaquat (October 28, 1947), *Documents on Kashmir Problem*, vol. 1, (New Delhi, India: Discovery Publishing House, 1991), 16; Nehru to Liaquat (November 8, 1947), *Documents on Kashmir*, vol. 1, 39.
22. “Representative of India’s Address to the President of the UNSC” (January 1, 1948), *Documents on Kashmir*, vol. 1, 82–3, 103.
23. UN Security Council resolution 47 (April 21, 1948), *On the India-Pakistan Question*. Accessible via [www.un.org](http://www.un.org).
24. “Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,” (August 13, 1948). Accessible via [www.un.org](http://www.un.org).
25. “Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,” (January 9, 1949). Accessible via [www.un.org](http://www.un.org).
26. Liaquat to Atlee (November 4, 1947), *Documents on Kashmir Problem*, vol. 1, 32.
27. Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah (August 25, 1952), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 19, 322–30. See also A. G. Noorani, “Review: How and Why Nehru and Abdullah Fell Out,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 34, no. 5 (1999), 269.
28. Nehru to Mountbatten (June 17, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 3, 229; Nehru to Patel (September 27, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 265.
29. By July 1953, Abdullah’s attitude towards India had degenerated to such an extent that he would reject as useless a meeting with Nehru in Delhi, and discourage even written correspondence. Nehru to Abdul Kalam Azad (July 19, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 290.
30. “Kashmir and Other Issues” (November 3, 1951), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 17, 424.
31. Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 117, 160.
32. Nehru to Rajendra Prasad (June 19, 1952), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 18, 404; Nehru to Syama P. Mookerjee (January 10, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 21, 179.
33. Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 130.
34. Nehru to B.C. Roy (June 29, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 22, 203; Nehru To JP Narayan (July 29, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 22, 300.
35. Noorani, “How and Why Nehru and Abdullah Fell Out,” 270.
36. Footnote in Nehru to Rajendra Prasad (July 15, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 288.
37. Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad (July 30, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 301–03.
38. Nehru to Rajendra Prasad August 9, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 316.
39. Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohd (August 15, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 328–29.
40. “Conversations with Mohd. Ali” (August 17, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 331–37.
41. “Conversations with Mohd. Ali” (August 20, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 343.
42. Gopal, *Nehru* 2, 182.
43. Nehru to Mohd. Ali (September 3, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 23, 367.
44. Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, 53–66. For documents from the proceedings of the Security Council see, *Documents on Kashmir Problem*.
45. Nehru to the Indian Delegation at the UN (January 9, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 21, 230.
46. Nehru to V. Pandit (November 10, 1952), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 20, 381.
47. Nehru to Gopalaswami Ayyangar (January 10, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 5, 194.
48. General Assembly Meeting 269 (March 18, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 2, 339.
49. Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, 89–146.
50. Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, 66–7; Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2008), 37.
51. Nehru to Patel (September 27, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 264.

52. In the Indian sub-continental numbering system, a “lakh” refers to a hundred thousand, whereas a “crore” refers to ten million. Mountbatten’s notes on discussion with Nehru (March 30, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 5, 261.
53. Nehru to GS Bajpai (December 5, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 7, 69.
54. Nehru to Liaquat (October 31, 1947), *Documents on Kashmir Problem*, vol. 1, 20; Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, 30.
55. GS Bajpai to V Pandit (March 9, 1951), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 56. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)
56. Nehru to the Maharaja of Kashmir (December 1, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 350.
57. Nehru to Gopalaswami Ayyangar (25 January 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 5, 202; Nehru to Roy Bucher (23 December 1948), *PN Haksar Papers Third Instalment*, Subject File 422, 15 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India); Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, 117.
58. Nehru To Krishna Menon (August 18, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 7, 299.
59. Notes on Nehru’s meeting with Dixon (August 20, 1950), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 15, Part I, 214.
60. “Owen Dixon’s Report” (September 30, 1950), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 15, Part I, 236.
61. Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, 119–26.
62. Bajpai quoted in Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*, 216.
63. Cable from Nehru to GS Bajpai (February 9, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 21, 238; B. N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru: 1948-1964* (New Delhi, India: Allied Publishers, 1972), 80.
64. Letter from Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah, “Impracticability of an Independent Kashmir” (August 25, 1952), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 19, 325.
65. Nehru to Krishna Menon (July 22, 1951), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 16, Part II, 323.
66. Quoted in Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, 102.
67. Nehru to GS Bajpai, “Assessment of Military Situation,” (February 8, 1953) *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 21, 236.
68. Statement by Gopalaswami Ayyangar in SC meeting 285 (April 19, 1948), *Documents on Kashmir Problem*, vol. 3, 17.
69. “Mediation by Owen Dixon” (August 24, 1950), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 15, Part I, 227.
70. Nehru to V Pandit (May 17, 1949), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 60. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)
71. “Meeting with Mountbatten” (December 8, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 365.
72. Nehru to Krishna Menon (September 8, 1949), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 13, 218.
73. According to Brines, this issue of ‘face’ (both vis-à-vis Pakistan, and internally) meant that “the Indians could give up the state through plebiscite, but they could not be placed in the position of being forced out. Delhi could not forget that the initial attacks had come largely from the area incorporated into Azad Kashmir.” Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London, UK: Pall Mall Press, 1968), 92.
74. Nehru to Lord Mountbatten (December 26, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 400.
75. Nehru to Lord Mountbatten (December 26, 1947), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 4, 401; “Arthur Henderson’s Report” (January 9, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 5, 182; Gopal, *Nehru* 2, 22.
76. Nehru to V. Pandit (July 2, 1949), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 11, 330.
77. “Integration of Kashmir” (May 21, 1949), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 11, . 124.
78. “Foreign Policy Regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan” (June 15, 1949), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 11, 370.
79. Nehru to Krishna Menon (September 11, 1949), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 13, 226.
80. “Kashmir and the US” (August 10, 1949), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 11, 340–2.
81. Note by Nehru on Kashmir (February 20, 1948), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 5, 224.
82. “Mediation by Owen Dixon” (August 24, 1950), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 15, Part I, 220.
83. *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 15, Part I, 224.

84. GS Bajpai to V Pandit (March 22, 1950), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 56. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)
85. V Pandit to GS Bajpai (May 24, 1951), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 56. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)
86. Nehru to MS Mehta (December 24, 1954), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 27, 179; Nehru to CC Desai (February 27, 1955), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 28, 235.
87. Cable from Nehru to CC Desai (March 8, 1955), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 28, 238.
88. "Talks with Mohd. Ali and Iskander Mirza—I" (May 14, 1955), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 28, 249–52.
89. Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. (July 12, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 32, 213; Record of Nehru's talks with Mohd. Ali (July 5, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 32, 376–77.
90. "Indo-Pakistan Relations- Conference of Heads of Indian Missions" (March 24–April 3, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 32, 432.
91. Cable from Nehru to V. Pandit (November 13, 1952), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 20, 348.
92. Gopal, *Nehru* 2, 184.
93. Nehru to Mohd. Ali (November 10, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 24, 416.
94. "US Military Aid to Pakistan" (March 1, 1954), *Kashmir 1947-56: Excerpts from Prime Minister Nehru's Speeches* (New Delhi, India: Information Service of India), 1956, 38–42.
95. "Practical Solution" (April 13, 1956), *Kashmir 1947-56*, 45–46.
96. Nehru to Mohd. Ali (December 9, 1953), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 24, 436.
97. Nehru to Mohd. Ali (March 5, 1954), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 25, 320.
98. V Pandit to Nehru (March 22, 1956), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 59. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)
99. Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life*, 267.
100. Nehru to Mohd. Ali (March 5, 1954), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 25, 320.
101. "India and Military Aid" (March 1, 1954), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 25, 351.
102. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru: 1948-1964*, 114–15.
103. "Manufacture and Purchase of Aircrafts" (February 21, 1954), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 25, 295.
104. Nehru's conversation with Pineau (March 11, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 32, 394
105. "Need for Non-Violent Defense Techniques" (May 4, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 38, 434.
106. "World Scenario and National Security" (March 13, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 32, 497.
107. Nehru to Lady Mountbatten (December 5, 1955), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 31, 333.
108. "Talks with Mohd. Ali and Iskander Mirza—IV" (May 17, 1955), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 28, 262.
109. Cable from Nehru to Krishna Menon (December 2, 1955), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 31, 373.
110. Quoted in Talk with Gunnar Jarring (March 27, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 37, 432.
111. "A Survey of Foreign Affairs" (March 20, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 32, 506.
112. Nehru to Subhadra Joshi (May 27, 1956), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 33, 384.
113. "A Holding Resolution on Kashmir" (February 16, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 400.
114. Cable from Nehru to Krishna Menon (February 21, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 406.
115. Cable from Nehru to V. Pandit (February 8, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 367.
116. Nehru to Mountbatten (February 11, 1957), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 61. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)
117. Nehru to Lord Mountbatten (February 11, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 383–4.
118. "On Discussions in the Security Council" (March 20, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 37, 422.
119. Nehru to V. Pandit (February 11, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 385.
120. Nehru to V. Pandit (February 12, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 390.
121. Nehru to V. Pandit (February 12, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 36, 392; V Pandit to Nehru—Memorandum of Talk with Lord Home (December 9, 1955), *VL Pandit Papers First Instalment*, Subject File 59. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Archives, New Delhi, India)

122. “Talk with Gunnar Jarring” (March 27, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 37, 434.
123. “On International Situation—I” (March 25, 1957), *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 37, . 489; Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*, 103.
124. *Swjn-Ss*, vol. 37, 489–90.
125. Gupta, *Kashmir*, 338.
126. Robert Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 203.

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